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INTRODUCTION 
In June 2013, the United States Supreme Court handed down a highly 
anticipated decision on DNA patenting, Association for Molecular Pathology 
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.1  Overturning the determination reached by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, but in line with the position of the 
U.S. solicitor general, the Court distinguished between DNA that has merely 
been isolated (genomic DNA, or “gDNA”) and DNA that has non-protein-
coding regions excised (complementary DNA, or “cDNA”).2  The Court held 
that, while gDNA is a patent-ineligible “product of nature,” cDNA is patent-
eligible.3  The upshot of the Court’s decision is that certain patents generally 
associated with diagnostic medicine (gDNA) are invalid, but patents typically 
associated with therapeutics (cDNA) are valid. 
The Court’s decision in Myriad came on the heels of its unanimous 
decision a year earlier in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc.4  In Mayo, the Court similarly overturned the Federal 
Circuit’s approach to deciding whether subject matter associated with 
diagnostic medical practice should be eligible for patenting.5  There the Court 
 
*  Elvin R. Latty Professor of Law, Duke Law School and Duke Institute for Genome 
Sciences & Policy. 
1. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
2. Id. at 2119. 
3. Id. 
4. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
5. Id. at 1296, 1302. 
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struck down method claims on measuring a thiopurine drug metabolite to 
adjust doses of a thiopurine drug, stating that the claims in question merely 
added routine activity to the law of nature that individuals metabolize 
thiopurine drugs differently.6 
The Court’s recent interest in diagnostic patents comes after years of 
heated public controversy over whether such patents pose an impediment to 
patient access and control of medical decision making.  This controversy 
encompasses, but is also broader than, the controversy over DNA patenting. 
Some critics of the Myriad and Mayo decisions fear that the Court was 
improperly swayed by concerns over access and patient control.  In this view, 
conventional among patent lawyers, validity doctrine exists to promote 
innovation—and only innovation.  The Myriad case, involving patents on 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes associated with breast cancer,7 is particularly 
troubling, as the momentum behind the case was clearly driven in part by 
concerns unrelated to innovation. 
At least some critics of the decisions might concede that patents were not 
essential for innovation in the specific factual scenarios raised by those cases.  
Even so, they would argue that the Court’s decisions are likely to have 
unintended consequences in areas where patents are more necessary.  These 
include not only therapeutics but also diagnostic research that is more 
complex, or less enmeshed in federal funding, than the research in Myriad and 
Mayo. 
In line with the conventional frame, this essay agrees that interpretation of 
patentable subject matter and other validity doctrines should be guided by 
innovation goals.  Although innovation and access cannot be entirely 
separated in the case of physician-researchers who also provide clinical care, 
the conceptual emphasis should be on innovation.  Promoting access should 
rely not on validity doctrine but rather on the carefully calibrated tools of 
infringement exemptions that borrow from antitrust principles, from agency 
use of background government rights to persuade those who receive federal 
funding to engage in appropriate licensing practices, and from insurer 
bargaining over price. 
Myriad and Mayo need not, however, be interpreted in a manner that is 
antithetical to innovation.  This essay lays out a path forward from these cases 
that is compatible with innovation goals. 
 
6. Id. at 1295. 
7. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2112. 
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I.  INNOVATION, ACCESS, AND VALIDITY 
As a historical matter, U.S. patent validity doctrine has focused on 
innovation.  The Constitution’s intellectual property provision, which 
discusses patents as promoting the “Progress of . . . useful Arts,” puts the 
spotlight squarely on innovation.8  Moreover, although the Supreme Court has 
given Congress broad leeway to interpret this constitutional provision,9 U.S. 
patent legislation, unlike legislation in other jurisdictions (e.g., Europe),10 
rarely imposes nonutilitarian limits on patent eligibility. 
This historical focus is reinforced by functional considerations.  As a 
functional matter, patent validity is a blunt and over-inclusive mechanism for 
policing concerns about access.  In many cases where access concerns are 
raised, problems could be alleviated by the patent owner’s being forced to 
adopt a different enforcement strategy.  In the Myriad case, for example, one 
very significant complaint was Myriad’s alleged use of its patent to deny 
women the option of a second opinion after having received Myriad’s test.11  
In that situation, principles of patent exhaustion drawing upon antitrust law 
suggest that patients who have already given Myriad a monopoly profit by 
using its services should have the option of using another provider to get a 
second opinion.  Conversely, providers who offer those second opinions 
shouldn’t be liable for patent infringement.  Efforts to create a safe harbor 
from infringement liability for second-opinion testing reflect these exhaustion 
principles.12 
Additionally, in many diagnostic-testing cases, including Myriad, flows of 
public funding from the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) to universities 
were heavily involved in the research that led to patenting.13  In Myriad itself, 
the relevant university was the University of Utah.14  Unlike the University of 
Utah, most universities have endorsed, and tend to follow, norms for licensing 
 
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
9. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 884, 887-889 (2012). 
10. See generally Directive 98/44, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 
1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13 (EC). 
11. See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2114. 
12. See Dan Vorhaus, House Introduces Patent Reform Proposal to Permit Second Opinions 
in Genetic Diagnostic Testing, GENOMICS LAW REPORT (June 15, 2011), 
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2011/06/15/house-introduces-patent-reform-proposal-
to-permit-second-opinions-in-genetic-diagnostic-testing. 
13. See SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOCIETY, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS 28 (2010) [hereinafter SACGHS Report], available at 
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/SACGHS/reports/SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf.  
14. SACGHS Report, supra note 13, at A-11. 
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diagnostic patents similar to those suggested by NIH.15  These norms include 
a recognition that exclusive licensing of diagnostic patents should be used 
primarily in those cases where substantial additional development associated 
with regulatory approval by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) is 
needed and exclusivity will provide the economic motivation for such 
development.16 
In cases like Myriad, where FDA regulatory approval did not need to be 
pursued (and was not pursued), the rationale for exclusive licensing is less 
clear.  Moreover, even in cases of exclusive licensing, university norms 
endorse preserving the option of second-opinion testing and shielding 
physician-researchers from the threat of infringement liability.  In this regard, 
the University of Utah and its exclusive licensee Myriad have been outliers.  
Outlier cases are not a reason to revise validity doctrine. 
In addition, insurance carriers, private and public, can and should bargain 
with patent owners over conditions of access.  The current reimbursement 
regime for diagnostics, in which insurers require proof of clinical efficacy 
before they provide coverage, may have limitations,17 but it gives insurers 
bargaining leverage.  Notably, in other countries, purchasers have exercised 
bargaining power to promote access to diagnostic testing.18 
After the Supreme Court’s decision, Myriad pledged formally for the first 
time that it would not assert its patents against noncommercial academic 
research.19  It also pledged that it would not interfere with the ability of 
patients to secure a second opinion.20  Had institutions such as NIH, other 
universities, and insurers applied pressure earlier, Myriad might have been 
forced to make this pledge earlier. 
II.  INNOVATION AND THE COURT’S RECENT SUBJECT MATTER DECISIONS 
Let us consider next the issue of innovation.  Although critics are right to 
argue that the Court’s decisions on patentable subject matter should focus on 
innovation, they mistakenly suggest that the recent decisions must be read in a 
manner that hampers innovation substantially.  The following discussion of 
 
15. See Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University Technology, ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. 
MANAGERS (March 6, 2007), http://www.autm.net/Nine_Points_to_consider.htm.  
16. See id. 
17. See Kevin A. Schulman & Sean R. Tunis, A Policy Approach to the Development of 
Diagnostic Tests, 28 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1157, 1158 (2010). 
18. See generally E. Richard Gold & Julia Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy 
Storm, 12(4) GENETICS IN MED. S39–S70 (April 2010). 
19. Myriad’s Pledge to Our Patients and the Research Community, MYRIAD GENETICS, INC., 
http://www.myriad.com/responsibility/myriads-pledge (last visited Oct. 31, 2013). 
20. Id. 
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Mayo and Myriad suggests how the decisions can be interpreted through an 
innovation-focused lens. 
For many decades, the Court has repeatedly stated that “abstract ideas,” “laws 
of nature,” and “products of nature” categorically fall outside the realm of 
patentability.  However, since many inventions could be seen as obvious 
applications of laws or products of nature,21 the Court has the responsibility to 
articulate what the categories mean and why they are off limits.  Unfortunately, 
the Court’s decisions have often been quite unhelpful in this regard.  Indeed, 
decisions such as Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. (1948)22 fail to 
clarify whether the Court is actually addressing eligible subject matter or is 
instead referring to some other validity requirement.  The problem of precisely 
parsing the Court’s discussions is particularly acute for cases decided before the 
1952 Patent Act,23 which first codified the obviousness requirement.  
Unfortunately for the current Court, it must contend with this old precedent as it 
goes forward. 
One obvious option would be to overrule or narrowly limit past precedent.  
Instead, in keeping with the Court’s general reluctance to declare prior 
decisions wrong, the Court’s recent decisions have, at least to some extent, 
tried to shape this past precedent into an economic, innovation-oriented 
framework. 
The 2012 Mayo case shows both the promise and limitations of the 
Court’s efforts.  In the opinion, the Court repeatedly focused on pragmatic 
consequences, most notably the possibility that claims on laws of nature—
even claims that satisfied all requirements of patentability other than subject 
matter—could “preempt” future research.24  It also recognized arguments 
made by the patentee and by various academics25 that a pragmatic approach 
should distinguish broad laws of nature that interfere with large areas of 
future innovation from narrower laws.  After recognizing these arguments, the 
Court further acknowledged that the law of nature it was addressing—that 
individuals metabolize thiopurine-containing drugs differently—was in fact 
quite narrow.26 
Unfortunately, the Court did not follow through on the promise of its 
 
21. See Rebecca Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand Control? Patentable Subject 
Matter for Diagnostic Methods After In re Bilski, 3 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 46 
(2012). 
22. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
23. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
24. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1291-1292. 
25. See Mark Lemley et al., Life after Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1334 (2011). 
26. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1302. 
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reasoning.  Instead, it insisted that it needed to enunciate a “bright-line 
prohibition” striking down all patents covering laws of nature, no matter 
how narrow.27  Although the Court invoked institutional-competence 
considerations, specifically the inability of the judiciary to distinguish 
between broad and narrow laws of nature,28 it was likely mindful of the 
reality that prior case law had failed to draw such policy-laden 
distinctions. 
The patents affected by Mayo could include many that relate to the 
burgeoning field of personalized medicine.  Personalized medicine revolves 
around “natural” associations between biomarkers such as DNA variations 
and patient prognosis or drug response.  Like the association at issue in 
Mayo, personalized medicine associations typically cover narrow laws of 
nature.  Unlike the association in Mayo, however, some of these associations 
may be quite difficult to find and validate clinically.  In those cases, patents 
may be necessary to induce development of relevant evidence.29  On its face, 
then, Mayo’s reasoning is in tension with an economically oriented 
approach. 
From the standpoint of those who care about innovation policy, all is not 
lost, however. In the context of conceding that the law of nature in question 
was narrow, the Mayo Court did emphasize the relatively trivial contribution 
made by the patentee.30  As the Court noted,31 the patent in question itself 
recognized that studies had already indicated that measurement of thiopurine 
metabolite level was important for predictions of efficacy.  The patentee had 
simply quantified the precise correlation between metabolite levels and 
effectiveness.  In contrast, certain advances in personalized medicine—for 
example, the development of tests that analyze the expression of multiple 
genes in a tumor sample as a guide to prognosis and future treatment—could 
be distinguished as much more complex than the simple test in Mayo.  In 
other words, not all diagnostic associations are alike, and perhaps the 
reasoning in Mayo can be restricted to the simple category. 
The Court’s reasoning and ultimate result in Myriad in 2013 can also be 
 
27. Id. at 1303. 
28. Id.  
29. See Michael Hopkins & Stuart Hogarth, Biomarker Patents for Diagnostics: Problem or 
Solution, 30(6) NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 498, 499 (June 2012). 
30. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303. 
31. Id. at 1292 (citing U. S. Patent No. 6,355,623, col. 8, ll. 37–40, 2 App. 10. (“Previous 
studies suggested that measurement of 6–MP metabolite levels can be used to predict clinical 
efficacy and tolerance to azathioprine or 6–MP”) (citing Cuffari, Théorêt, Latour, & Seidman, 
6-Mercaptopurine Metabolism in Crohn’s Disease: Correlation with Efficacy and Toxicity, 39 Gut 
401 (1996)). 
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interpreted as tracking relevant economic considerations.  Yet, as with Mayo, 
one’s reading of the case has to be oriented in that direction. 
In Myriad, the Court began by observing that under the “well-established” 
balance that patent law tries to strike between creating incentives for 
innovation and blocking future innovation, gDNA claims covering broad 
categories of information, rather than “the specific chemical composition of a 
particular molecule,” are suspect.32  Informational content is, however, only 
one factor in the calculus.  Although the Court indicated that cDNA claims 
also cover information, it ultimately held that the removal of noncoding DNA 
makes cDNA molecules patent-eligible.33 
The Court’s analysis failed to enunciate why claims to information in the 
form of cDNA are less problematic than claims to information in the form of 
gDNA.  This failure is significant and renders the opinion less useful as a 
stand-alone document.  Nonetheless, lower courts could certainly read the 
Court’s distinction through the economic lens invoked by the two amicus 
briefs that called the distinction to the Court’s attention—those of the solicitor 
general and of the prominent geneticist Eric Lander.34  Both of these briefs 
emphasized that while gDNA claims could interfere with a broad range of 
downstream uses, cDNA claims had narrower application specific to 
therapeutic development and could be worked around for other purposes.35 
With gDNA patents now out of the picture, concerns that the platform 
technology of whole genome sequencing could be impeded by such patents 
are now gone.  Some have argued that these patents would not have posed a 
major obstacle.36  But dissipating the shadow of infringement liability to the 
greatest extent possible was important for officials at NIH and the U.S. Office 
of Science and Technology Policy.  They successfully convinced the solicitor 
general to reject the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s position, which 
allowed claims on “isolated” DNA molecules. 
As it happens, NIH has a long history of helping to shape validity 
 
32. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116, 2118-2119. 
33. Id. at 2119-2120. 
34. Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. __ (2013) (No. 12-398), available at http://www.justice.gov/
osg/briefs/2012/3mer/1ami/2012-0398.mer.ami.pdf; Brief for Amicus Curiae Eric S. Lander in 
Support of Neither Party, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. __ 
(2013) (No. 12-398), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
supreme_court_preview/briefs-v2/12-398_neither_amcu_lander.authcheckdam.pdf.  
35. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra note 
31, at 9–11; Brief for Amicus Curiae Eric S. Lander in Support of Neither Party, supra note 31, at 27. 
36. See Christopher Holman, Debunking the Myth that Whole-Genome Sequencing Infringes 
Thousands of Gene Patents, 30(3) NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 240 (March 2012). 
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requirements in the context of DNA patents.37  Befitting its role as a research 
funder, its concerns have been innovation, not access.  NIH played that role 
again in the Myriad case. 
To be sure, the Court’s decision may also weaken the diagnostic service 
monopoly model of firms such as Myriad, at least to the degree that this 
model relies on patents.  The day the opinion was announced, Ambry 
Genetics, GeneDx, DNA Traits, Quest Diagnostics, and Pathway Genomics, 
as well as a number of academic institutions, stated that they would begin 
testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations.38  That said, the opinion leaves 
Myriad room to sue on a variety of claims, particularly method claims, not at 
issue in the Supreme Court case.  And Myriad has in fact sued several firms, 
including Ambry Genetics and Gene by Gene.39 
NIH, which appears to have funded research that led to at least some of 
the patents in the suits against Ambry and Gene by Gene, would be well-
advised to track these lawsuits closely.  Under the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 
agencies can force additional licensing of federally funded patents where such 
“action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which are not 
reasonably satisfied” by the federal grantee or its licensee.40  In its briefing 
seeking a preliminary injunction, Myriad is making the perhaps 
counterintuitive argument that such relief would promote public health by 
prohibiting patients from using diagnostic laboratories that do not have its 
track record in interpreting mutations.41  If a court were to agree with these 
arguments (and of course agree with Myriad’s argument that its claims are 
likely to be valid, also a contested proposition), NIH should consider 
counterarguments that the Myriad track record is not as unequivocally 
superior as the firm claims.  If these arguments appear meritorious, NIH 
might evaluate whether licensing to other firms would promote Bayh-Dole’s 
objectives with respect to health and safety.  Even though NIH appears to 
have background rights in only some of the patents that are being asserted, 
even an incomplete stake might provide some leverage. 
 
37. Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for Policy 
Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1241 (2012). 
38. Arti K. Rai & Robert Cook-Deegan, Moving Beyond “Isolated” Gene Patents, 341 
SCIENCE 137, 138 (12 July 2013). 
39. See Univ. of Utah Research Found. v. Ambry Genetics Corp., No. 2:13-cv-00640-RJS 
(C.D. Utah July 9, 2013); Univ. of Utah Research Found. v. Gene by Gene, No. 2:13-cv-00643 (C.D. 
Utah July 10, 2013). 
40. 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2). 
41. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief and Memorandum in Support at 
40, Univ. of Utah Research Found. v. Ambry Genetics Corp., No. 2:13-cv-00640-RJS (C.D. Utah 
July 9, 2013). 
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III.  BEYOND DIAGNOSTICS 
For many in the biopharmaceutical industry, the concern raised by Myriad 
is not invalidation of gDNA patents but instead unintended consequences for 
patents associated with therapeutic molecules.  All therapeutic molecules 
require approval by the FDA, and most analysts agree that patents provide 
important incentives for expending the resources necessary to secure such 
approval.  The amicus briefs filed by the solicitor general and Eric Lander 
called specifically for upholding cDNA claims typically associated with 
therapeutics.42 
Therapeutic products that could be affected include proteins and 
antibodies.  Although many protein and antibody patents now claim 
molecules that are clearly synthetic, certain claims could be seen as 
encompassing naturally occurring molecules.  Even in these cases, however, 
the claims would not necessarily be invalid.  Presumably the antibodies and 
proteins would, in the words of the Myriad Court, be claimed as something 
closer to “specific chemical compositions” than to information.43  Lower 
courts could focus on this aspect of the Myriad opinion in upholding such 
claims.  Similarly, in addressing patents covering small molecule chemicals 
with important therapeutic uses that have been isolated from nature,44 courts 
could focus on the fact that these patents typically claim “specific chemical 
compositions.” 
CONCLUSION 
Without a doubt, the Court’s recent spate of activity in the area of 
diagnostic patenting has caused considerable anxiety for those concerned 
about innovation.  To some extent, the anxiety is justified.  But lower courts 
could choose to read the Court’s opinions in a manner that is friendly to 
innovation.  This essay has attempted to provide a path forward for lower 
courts. 
 
42. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra note 31, 
at 26; Brief for Amicus Curiae Eric S. Lander in Support of Neither Party, supra note 31, at 27. 
43. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2118. 
44. Many such molecules are listed in an amicus brief field by the Biotechnology Industry 
Organization.  Brief for Amicus Curiae the Biotechnology Industry Organization in Support of 
Respondents at 20–21, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. __ (2013) 
(No. 12-398), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court
_preview/briefs-v2/12-398_resp_amcu_bio.authcheckdam.pdf. 
